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The 2024 UK General Election: Results, Issues and a Commentary regarding Electoral Democracy:
Less a Landslide than Implosion and Fragmentation
Contrary to many comments it’s not so much a Labour landslide (e.g. The Guardian headline on 5 July: “Labour landslide”) but more an implosion of the Conservative vote combined with fragmentation of parties. Thus, Labour won 63% of all seats i.e. almost double their 34% of the vote while turnout was modest at 60%, in fact down nearly 7% on 2019.Conversely the Conservative vote share at 24% exceeded their share of seats (19%) by 5% yet it almost halved from 43% of the vote in 2019 to 24% this year.
The 2024 UK General Election: Results, Issues and a Commentary regarding Electoral Democracy:
Less a Landslide than Implosion and Fragmentation
Key Results of the 2024 UK General Election
Labour formed a new government, its first since 1997, with 412 seats (up 214 on their 2019 result). Conservatives held 121 seats (down 251); Liberal Democrats rose to 72 seats (up 64); SNP reduced to 9 (down 38); Reform UK have 5 (up 5) Greens have 4 (up 3); Sinn Fein retain 7 (no change); Plaid Cymru 4 (up 2); DUP 5 (down 3); Independents 6 (up 6) and others 5.
Boundary changes meant an extra 10 seats in England; 2 and 4 less in Scotland and Wales respectively and first GE in the UK with compulsory photo ID required. This was only a requirement previously in Northern Ireland.
Contrary to many comments it’s not so much a Labour landslide (e.g. The Guardian headline on 5 July: “Labour landslide”) but more an implosion of the Conservative vote combined with fragmentation of parties. Thus, Labour won 63% of all seats i.e. almost double their 34% of the vote while turnout was modest at 60%, in fact down nearly 7% on 2019.Conversely the Conservative vote share at 24% exceeded their share of seats (19%) by 5% yet it almost halved from 43% of the vote in 2019 to 24% this year.
Fragmentation in the growth of other parties especially Reform UK, but also the Greens and Liberal Democrats. Notable in this respect was that Reform’s vote share at 14% was way above its seat total of 5 and the Liberal Democrats share of votes at 12% was a little above its share of seats - a reversal of their usual performance. As seen above their total number of seats rose dramatically while the SNP’s fell dramatically.
There had been much discussion ahead of the election at presumed significantly improved ‘accuracy’ of opinion polls e.g. the MRP polls applied to individual constituency voter characteristics, but although the tracker polls had Labour coming down to 41% from a near constant 45% since early 2023, in fact even the latest figure overestimated their actual share of 34% by 7%. The Conservative actual share at 24% was 4% above the last tracker figure (still perhaps a bit of a ‘shy Tory’ factor plus a response to the “supermajority” scare tactic?).
How closely did the exit poll mirror the actual outcome? The BBC exit poll was virtually spot on for Labour suggesting 410 seats versus the actual of 412 but at 131 for the Conservatives it was 10 seats too generous. Perhaps the biggest divergence was for Reform UK where the exit poll had them on 13 versus an actual result at 5 seats. The Liberal Democrats exceeded the exit poll by 11 (72 against 61) no doubt due to effectively targeted campaigning and tactical voting.
In terms of the four Nations, there are now no Conservative seats in Wales, Labour won 27 (+9), Plaid Cymru 4 (+2) and Lib Dems 1 (+1) with Conservatives 0 (-12) on notional result of 2019 to take account of the overall reduction in seats. The SNP’s loss of 38 seats to just 9 was not a total collapse, but it will result in a significant reduction in the priority accorded to Scottish independence albeit there is a growing divergence emerging with support for independence not weakening as much as that for SNP itself.
In Northern Ireland, the DUP remains the largest pro-union party but had its worst result in a recent Westminster election with vote share (-8.5) and losing 3 of its 8 seats to become the second largest party. The pro-union parties retain 8 seats; and the ‘unaligned’ Alliance party has a single seat. The nationalist community saw Sinn Fein stay on 7 seats, making it now the largest single party – increasing its majorities in the seats it defended while the SDLP remains on 2 seats. Some further discussion is now underway on the sensitive issue of a possible border poll.
Within England the 2019 Conservative gains in the north have largely gone as it reverts to the Labour “Red Wall” with the Lib Dems making big gains in the South West and Home Counties (including 6 seats in London) and holding several seats in the Midlands - the so-called “Blue Wall”. Labour took 59 out of 75 seats in London halving the Conservative share while in Birmingham Labour made gains across the city, losing some seats here and elsewhere to independents that campaigned on the issue of Gaza (Sunday Times 7 July 2024).
There were also a couple of other issues of note. This is the first time in a General Election where voter I.D. was mandatory, following an unsuccessful challenge to the Supreme Court. Is the need for additional security against voter fraud, of which there appears to be little evidence in Great Britain, balanced by the numbers who may not have gone to vote or been turned away?
Post COVID has seen a further increase in the proportion of voters using a Postal Vote (PV). The Association of Electoral Administrators say legislation is no longer adequate with an estimated 10m people registered for a PV this year; up 20% on 2019 and of these 1.3m applied for a PV between the day this ‘snap election’ was called and the PV registration day. This resulted in a very tight timetable to process the postal votes and in some cases them not arriving in a timely manner (e.g. in the author’s Council area several voters didn’t get their PV ballots; one couple got two and one of his adult children only received their polling card – not the PV ballot form – the day before the GE).
Implications of the 2024 General Election for Proportional Representation (PR).
Looking at the total votes cast and resulting seats enables a votes per MP elected to be readily calculated and demonstrates marked variations. Thus, for a selection of parties in the 2024 G.E.
|
MPs Total |
Total Votes |
Votes/MP Elected |
LAB |
412 |
9,731,363 |
23,619 |
CON |
121 |
6,827,112 |
56,422 |
LD |
72 |
3,519,163 |
48,877 |
REF |
5 |
4,106,661 |
821,332 |
Green |
4 |
1,943,258 |
485,814 |
So, under our first past the post system Labour only needed less than half the votes the Lib Dems needed and not quite a third the Conservatives needed to get each MP elected. It seems doubtful that all of this was due to the efficient geographical focus of the Labour campaign. It is unclear how much was due ‘our winner takes all’ single member constituency electoral system.
What number of seats might the main parties have secured had this election been held under PR?
|
Seats won if PR. |
Actual 2024 seats won |
Variance |
LAB |
219 |
412 |
‘Excess’ 193 |
CON |
154 |
121 |
‘Shortage’ 33 |
REF |
93 |
5 |
‘Shortage’ 88 |
LD |
79 |
72 |
‘Shortage’ 7 |
GRN |
44 |
4 |
‘Shortage’ 40 |
SNP |
16 |
9 |
‘Shortage’ 7 |
Source: Survation
So, Labour under first past the post, can be said to have won an ‘excess’ of 193 had this General Election been run on a PR system but all others had an implied shortage from 7 for LD and SNP to 33 for CON and 40 for Green and no less than 88 for Reform UK. Of course, each electoral system produces its own voting behaviour and we should not necessarily extrapolate a direct proportionate result. There was a high degree of tactical voting in this election, with in many cases an endeavour to vote for the candidate most likely to succeed against the Conservative. This worked where this was clear and was reinforced by the campaign strategies of targeting by both Labour and the Liberal Democrats. For example, tactical voting was the second most important reason for voting Liberal Democrat. It’s unclear how much of the Reform UK vote was really a protest against the Conservations. A PR system would largely negate such tactical voting.
Implications for McDougall Trust
The principal object of McDougall Trust is to advance knowledge of and research into representative democracy. Further research could start with investigating how far the current UK voting system with this election’s very disproportionate result along with the increasing fragmentation of the party political system may undermine public confidence in the outcome. This is particularly important with the rise of populism which exploits community alienation and “voices not heard”. How mainstream political parties reconcile their approaches to electoral reform with their underpinning values of equality and human rights is an emerging question.
In my view McDougall Trust (McDT) should consider commissioning expert research to both further the knowledge base and possibly to provide the basis to again seek to open up discussion on fair representation and the different options available drawing upon relevant national and international experience. Any such research could build on that previously undertaken by the Constitution Unit at UCL for McDT on discourse and other aspects of electoral debate seen to arise from the UK’s 2016 Referendum on E.U. membership.
Tom Walsh,
Trustee, McDougall Trust
25 July 2024
(This is a personal contribution)